

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR (Moscow Oblast)

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SUBJECT 1. Political Attitudes in the USSR
2. Foreign Radio Broadcasts in the USSR

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POLITICAL CONDITIONSSoviet Attitudes toward Political Problems

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1. [REDACTED] the average Soviet citizen [REDACTED] was a dyed-in-the-wool supporter of the Soviet government. This was particularly true of the younger generation. They certainly appeared to be active supporters of the regime, to judge by their participation in political activities at the plant. [REDACTED]

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2. [REDACTED] the average Soviet citizen [REDACTED] extremely patriotic. The Soviet Government has apparently developed greater support from the population by its nationalistic propaganda than by propagating Communist ideology. [REDACTED]

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SECRET

-2-

25X1

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3.

[redacted]
the average Soviet citizen greatly respected Stalin and [redacted]
propaganda glorifying him had been effective. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviet [redacted]
[redacted] repeated, word for word, the various glorifying
slogans and descriptions applied to Stalin. [redacted]
[redacted]

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4. It is noteworthy that the possibility of achieving communism was a topic of conversation more frequently in 1951 than before. Perhaps this was the result of a propaganda campaign which was devoted to the successful fulfillment of the first postwar Five-Year Plan. Local propagandists frequently made reference to Stalin's speech in 1946 regarding long-term production goals and claimed that communism could be introduced once these goals had been attained.

5. [redacted] the average Soviet worker was convinced of the likelihood of achieving communism. First of all, it is natural for him to believe in something that would prove beneficial to himself. Secondly, Soviet propaganda was in general a very effective instrument. By way of illustration, some children of German specialists who attended the Soviet-run school in Krasnogorsk came to believe in the truthfulness and correctness of Communist ideology, despite the fact that they were able to view Soviet living conditions with a certain degree of objectivity and were subject to the influence of their parents at home.

6. Regarding those aspects of Soviet society which met with the particular approval of the Soviet population, my Soviet colleagues were especially proud of the rapid development of Soviet industry and technology. For example, they considered their newest jet fighters, the construction of large electric power complexes, and the Moscow subway as outstanding achievements. The average Soviet worker or technician was highly regarded and made good use of the numerous career-building and vocational facilities available in the Krasnogorsk area. [redacted]
[redacted]

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7. [redacted] the consumer-goods industry was the only feature of Soviet life which was the subject of constant criticism by the Soviet population. The inefficient distribution system, the fact that not enough goods were available to meet demands, and the fact that a shopper had to spend so much time in searching for a certain article were all subjects of frequent complaints. Undoubtedly, the Soviet citizenry in voicing these complaints was simultaneously condemning not only the end results but also the cause

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

25X1

of the situation, namely, the policy of developing basic industries at the expense of consumer goods. However, this aspect of state policy was not openly attacked.

- 25X1 8. [redacted] Soviet [redacted] concerning foreign relations, [redacted] repeated the general lines of the official propaganda theme that the West, especially the aggressive policies of the United States, was to blame for present East-West tensions. [redacted] 25X1
- 25X1 [redacted] the anti-American propaganda campaign had definitely turned public opinion against the United States. [redacted] 25X1
- [redacted]

- 25X1 9. [redacted] two incidents which illustrate the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda regarding the ubiquity of American spies. In one case, a Soviet engineer employed in a responsible position told me in all seriousness that he was convinced that 50 per cent of the German specialists were working for American intelligence agencies. Another incident concerned three elderly German specialists, all of whom were more than 60 years of age. These three gentlemen were taking a stroll in the vicinity of the nearby sanatorium for high-ranking Soviet Army officers, located at Arkhangelskoye. A collective farmer working in his fields saw them and reported to the police that American spies were snooping around the sanatorium. Not very much time passed before a military police patrol appeared and picked them up for questioning. The three were released on establishing their identity. 25X1

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SECRET

-4-

25X1

Engineers and other technicians sent to China were offered extraordinarily good terms of employment.

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[redacted] The Soviet people had truly participated in a "total war"

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[redacted] The outbreak of the war in Korea considerably intensified these anxieties. This acute nervousness diminished in succeeding months, although it was subject to a brief renewal brought about by the entrance of China in the Korean War.

14. It was not directly stated that they feared American aggression, that a new world war would begin with an American attack on the USSR. However, this was undoubtedly the popular impression, to judge by their acceptance of other propaganda themes branding the United States as an aggressor nation. [redacted] gave no indication that they doubted the official line claiming that the United States had launched the war in Korea.

Foreign Radio Broadcasts

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16.

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[redacted] all apartments in the Krasnogorsk area were equipped with wired loud-speaker outlets. [redacted] at least 50 per cent, perhaps 60 per cent to 70 per cent, of all Soviet families owned wired loudspeakers.

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[redacted] the Soviet population was very interested in acquiring radios. The "VEF" and "Baltika" models were the most popular radio sets. Imported radios of German manufacture were in less demand since they were not covered by a guarantee. The "VEF" and "Baltika" sets were guaranteed for six months.

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Radios sold in Soviet stores were not limited to any particular wave bands or to domestic broadcasts. There was no increased emphasis on wired loudspeaker networks.

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18. It is interesting to note in this connection that larger, more powerful radios, capable of receiving broadcasts from abroad, were more in evidence in Soviet stores in later years. Previously, the small "Rekord" radio set [redacted] it did not have short-wave reception) was the most popular model.

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SECRET
-5-



25X1


Miscellaneous Comments

19. The Soviet economist, Professor VARGA, once gave a lecture for the German specialists at Plant No. 393 in the latter part of 1949 or the beginning of 1950. He appeared in a regular lecture series sponsored by the Central Council of Trade Unions. VARGA was introduced as the renowned Hungarian-born Soviet economist. 

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20. The German specialists living in Krasnogorsk were housed in four large apartment buildings. These buildings, prior to our arrival, had been the site of an Antifa school, where German emigrants and selected prisoners-of-war were trained as propagandists and potential Party functionaries. It was rumored that the son of GDR President PIECK and former Minister RAU had been trained at this school.

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